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I Decentering the Ego-self and 
Releasing the Care-consciousness 
Heesoon Bal, Simon Frasea· University 
Yun Yen asked Tao Wu, "What does the Bodhisattva of Great Compassion 
use so many hands and eyes for?'' 
Wu said, "It's like someone reaching back grasping for a pillow in the 
middle of the night." 
Yen said, "/understand." 
Wu said, "How do you understand it?" 
Yen said, "All over tire body are hands and eyes." 
The Blue Cliff Record 
].Introduction 
On the eve of the new millennium, we face a world whose "carrying 
capacity"1 is, by all accounts, dangerously out of balance with even the basic 
requirements for the planet's population of six billion people.2 
The human population as a whole, but especially in the industrialized 
countries, has been rapidly diminishing the earth's carrying capacity. With the 
prospect of adding another four billion in the next fifty years, our utmost chal-
lenge is to expand our caring capacity radically so as not only to cope with the 
ever serious consequences of social inequities and ecological damage but also to 
restore the earth's overall carrying capacity.3 Since caring is a moral capacity, 
the challenge of expanding caring properly belongs to the task of moral educa-
tion. This paper explores ways of cultivating an extraordinarily expansive 
caring consciousness for an extraordinarily challenging time such as ours. 
This is not the first time humans have faced the challenge of caring. But 
now the scope and urgency of the challenge have changed. Morality bas always 
been centrally about extending care-consciousness beyond the narrow confines 
of the individual self to the other, be it the family, clan, village, or nation. We 
arc now challenged to extend care-consciousness to the whole of the biosphere 
and to the whole of humanity as a constituent part of it.4 AJso, unlike before, we 
do not have the luxury of evading this challenge for the same reason that we 
could not afford to let a critically wounded person lose more blood. In both 
cases, intensive care is a must. 
My argument proceeds in two stages: first, I analyze the conditions that 
afford caring, and then I examine one "experiment" in caring consciousness, 
that of the Buddhist theory and practice of caring. I select this example because 
it illustrates clearly the conditions of care-consciousness that I analyze in the 
first part of the paper. 
2. The conditions of caring 
Caring and other cognate moral dispositions are said to be "other-
regarding" virtues (Blum, 1994). In other words, caring occurs when the self 
directs its good-willed attention to the other. The objective of caring is the 
well-being of the other. However, just as water naturally flows toward the sea, 
caring naturally flows toward those to whom we have close ties. The closer the 
relatedness is, the more naturally and abundantly caring flows. 
The strongly bonded parent and child would be a paradigm of such close 
relatedness. Thus, U10ugh caring is an other-regarding virtue, here "otherness" 
has to be understood in tenns of the degree of self-other relatedness. For this 
reason, I arfuc that natural caring ends at the boundary of the self-other 
relationship. That is, when the other lies outside the parameters of self-other 
rr.latcdncss, the othr.r is a foreign entity, Rn alien. Given this, the self's attitude 
towards the other may not be just indifference but often active discomfort and 
even fear. Xenophobia6 is one of the oldest fears of humanity. It does not just 
paralyze the afflicted into indifference and inaction. In the attempt to overcome 
the discomfort and fear, the afflicted may set out to destroy the alien object. 
But why should otherness cause such discomfort and fear? I suggest, 
wilhout elaborating here,7 that the answer may lie in the phenomenon of self-
awareness itself. Insofar as the self is aware of itself as a substantively separate 
and distinct individual entity, all others arc excluded from the self. What the 
other is, the self is not, and vice versa. And insofar as the self's overwhelming 
interest is its own survival, the other poses real or potential threat. As long as 
the self perceives the other as a source of potential or real threat to itself, its 
response comes roughly in three kinds: avoid the other; "thingify" it and turn it 
into one's resource and instrument; or, going a step further, simply annihilate it. 
None of these moves entertains the possibility of the self considering the other 
symmetrically; first, considering the other as being 11 self to itself and, second, 
considering how this self may also appear as an other to that self, just as that self 
appears as an other to this self. However, if such perception of symmetry docs 
occur, then it can be the basis for a mutual or reciprocal relationship between the 
self and the other. Contractarian relationship is the result. 
However, in real world situations, the contractarian relationship is dif-
ficult to achieve and maintain for it requires that all participants be equal 
consociates,8 capable of reciprocating perceptions of each other that are 
mutually recognized to be valid. Spelled out this way, we should realize that the 
vast majority of others in the world, both in the human and non-human domains, 
arc functionally excluded from the possibilities of contractarian relationships 
with each other. For example, we surely cannot expect animals to enter into a 
contractarian relationship with humans. Nor is the prospect of such a relation-
ship guaranteed amongst humans. Hence, if our moral objective is the self-other 
relatedness that encompasses the whole of humanity and beyond, the contrac-
tarian response, although more viable than the previously mentioned other three 
responses, is still of limited utility. 
It seems to me that the contractarian response is a limit case of self-other 
relatedness in the sense that it is the maximal relatedness that we can hope to 
achieve, given the initial understanding that the self is substantively and 
categorically separate from the other. But the givenness of this initial under-
standing is not immune to challenge. I would propose that the self is not 
substantively separate from the other and, thr.reforc, is inherently open to, and is 
completed In, the other. In other words, the self is always already partially 
constituted by the other. As such, the self is never identical to itself insofar as 
it co-emerges moment by moment with the whole shifting field of otherness that 
the self encounters. In this sense, then, the self is continuous with the other.l0 
The self dynamically flows into, out of, and with the other, creatively assuming 
a complex, polymorphous sense of agency. It is not the simple sense of agency 
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wherein the subject (the self) docs something to its object (the other). Returning 
to my earlier remark about the natural flow of caring in the self-other related-
ness, I now claim that moral caring as a flow of attention, concern, love, and 
compassion would be generously afforded in the fluid dynamics of the self-other 
continuity. Conversely, the flow of moral caring would naturally be checked or 
even blocked in the self that perceives itsr.lf as c1ttegorically separate from the 
other. 
3. Caring as the foundation of morality 
Caring resulting from the self-other continuity is foundational to morality 
in the eudaimonic view of morality that aims at mutual harmony and flourishing 
amongst all beings whose existence is perceived to be interdependent and co-
emergent. Seen this way, the domain of morality is not restricted to human 
relationship but encompasses the whole of the ecosystem and beyond. 11 The 
effort of moral education in this non-anthropocentric framework may be seen as 
a progressive widening of the circle of bonding or integration, starting with the 
self's integration with the family, community, and so on, and gradually reaching 
out to the biosphere and beyond. This model of widening of the moral horizon 
echoes the Confucian notion of self-cultivation (fu, 1994). In broadly com~ar­
ing the latter model of moral education to the prevailing model in the West, 2 a 
significant difference will be noticed. Namely, the hallmark of moral develop-
ment and achievement is not autonomy (literally, self-governing) but "on-
tonomy," (literally, reality-governing) to use Panikkar's neologism. By "on-
tonomy," I understand the realization of the intrinsic interconnectedness of all 
beings (Panikkar, 1992). Thich Nhat Hanh's equivalent terminology is "in-
terbeing." These notions refer to the realization that the self is inseparable from 
all other beings and, hence, that moral caring is not really about building up the 
sovereign autonomous self who can then bestow caring upon other beings and 
situations deemed to be worthy of respect according to some rational calculus. 
Rather, it is about empathy and compassion born of the perception that there is 
no such thing as an autonomous self and that the self and the other make up one 
unity of continuous Being. 
The autonomy-based moral paradigm cannot but epistemically and 
psychologically privilege the self. For this reason, even in the best effort of 
directing caring outwardly to the other, it is easily caught up in the dilemma and 
calculus of self-interest versus other-interest. Enlightened self-interest as a 
morar stance, widely endorsed at present, is a predictable result. As well, 
altruism that subsumes the self-interest under the other-interest is the other, 
opposite result. Both of these moral orientations share the same origin in a 
self-other dichotomy. However, in the ontonomy-based moral paradigm that I 
am advocating, since the self and the other together form an ontological unit, the 
self as a constituent part can no more be privileged than the other. Let me 
illustrate this point with a couple of examples. 
To be a truly moral person in the ontonomic sense, it is not enough that I 
help my friend in distress by offering my time and energy to look after her baby 
when she is unable to pay for baby-sitting but has to go out to meet her appoint-
ment. If I perform this good Samaritan's deed out of a sense of moral duty, 
grudgingly and with resentment, I am less than fully moral, although I probably 
am more moral than if I did not help at all. Similarly, if my deciding to help her 
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bas been motivated by a prudential or self-seeking consideration involved in 
calculating some kind of return benefit for me in the future this too is not 
perfectly moral. As well, if I helped my friend because not to do so' wouid have 
made me feel bad in having failed to meet my moral standard or because know-
ing that I have done good deeds would give me a deep sense of satisfaction and 
pride, these, too, would he. less than fully moral. We arc less than fully moral so 
long as the motivation to perform moral actions stems from considering one's 
interest or welfare over and above others'. To make the same point but in 
reverse, to he fully moral is to place the welfare of others on equal footing as 
one's own, realizing that the self and the other arc inherently coincidental or 
extensive. We may call this idea the moral principle of equality and impar-
tiality, and, as I derived it, it is based on moral ontonomy discussed earlier. 
However, this principle is not to be mistaken as an understanding that, 
therefore, one should not invest more time and attention in oneself than in 
another. Indeed, I think we can show that it is in general a more efficient way of 
overall ontonomical caring to have each person first look after himself or herself 
as far as possible and only second look after, or be looked after by, others. Can 
we imagine, for a simple example, how inefficient it would be to always rely on 
having others tic one's own shoe laces? But this strategy of tying one's own 
shoe laces does not conflict with the moral principle of equality and impartiality. 
The reason why I tie my own laces as long as I am able to is not because I take 
greater interest in my own well-being than in others'. By the same token, the 
principle of equality and impartiality does not require one to place the interest of 
others' well-being over and above one's own. But, again, in order to most 
skillfully observe this principle, one might have to pay more attention to 
another's shoe laces than one's own. I can afford to go around with loose shoe 
laces without too great a risk of tripping and breaking my bones, but given the 
state of my octogenarian mother's extreme osteoporosis and the consequent risk 
of injury, I pay far greater attention to her shoe laces than mine, and this is not 
beca.use I consider her well-being greater than mine. In fact, in the self-other 
contmuity model that I have advanced, separating my well-being from my 
mother's makes little sense. 
Let me try another example. Suppose that I witness a fire. I sec a stranger 
engulfed in flame. What do I do as a moral person? If my sense of morality is 
that of enlightened self-interest, my first moral impulse would not be to rush into 
the fire and drag out the victim. After all, it is the stranger and not me who is 
burning. If I decide to risk myself to rescue the victim, it has to be for a reason 
strong enough to override my sense of risk to my person, even if the reason is 
my moral heroism or the dreadful thought of guilt for not rescuing the victim. 
Or, if my sense of morality is disciplined by Kantian deontology, I might 
be dragging myself, literally, to the stranger in flame out of moral duty, while I 
fight my own disinclination and my wish to run away. Other moral paradigms 
would discipline our sense of morality differently, but I shall not undertake the 
exercise of comparison here but instead focus on the moral paradigm of on-
tono!"y. If my moral sense has been disciplined by the latter, my impulse would 
be srmply to rush in to drag out the burning victim, just as I would simply pull 
out my own leg when caught in a fire. The moral motivation for these two 
actions would be. exactly the same-to end suffering. It does not matter to my 
moral impulse whether the suffering is located in my body or in someone else's, 
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for "I" am connected by empathy and compassion to both locations or bodies. 
However, between impulse and action, the practical intelligence that calculates 
the optimal moral performance is interposed. Thus, though my impulse is to 
simply rush into the flame, my practical intelligence may inform me that there is 
no way I can drag out the victim, given that he must weigh two or tltree times 
my weight. In the worst scenario, there may be absolutely nothing I can do to 
save the victim or lessen his suffering. I just might have to suffer the agony of 
witnessing tlte victim painfully burning to death, just as I would suffer the pain 
of my leg or the rest of my body burning, if I were not in any position to move 
my body. This is not an example of tlte break-down of caring but of the material 
constraints that caring always faces in expressing itself. 
4. Obstacles to moral caring 
Our culture stresses autonomy and consequent individual excellence and 
achievement. Successful people arc those who stand, or stand out, over and 
ab~ve others. Hegemony is the name of the social game for both persons and 
nat1ons. Global competition is not just a slogan in the economic-financial field· 
it has so deeply entered education tath it has become one of the main educationai 
goals for our schools. Now, to be fair, I must acknowledge that co-operation, 
too, figures in this game. But it is no less egocentric. We co-operate so as to 
gain individual advantage.13 But co-operation as such cannot be the basis for 
the kind of morality based on ontonomy that I have sketched here. How then do 
we realize and enact an ontonomy-based morality? In keeping with my earlier 
~!aim that the realization of ontonomy results in compassion and empathy, this 
ttme, I argue the converse-namely, that through tl1e exercise of empathy and 
compassion, we realize the continuity of the self with the other. In a moment of 
empathic perception where the presence of the other bas affected one to the 
point of bringing about a whole chain of bodily responses, one may realize if 
one thinks about it carefully, bow much the other bas become part of the self in 
the literal scnse. 14 For example, the perfume of the flower in the room enters 
my body and psyche and become part of me and, thus, who I am this moment is 
a transfusion of me and the flower, however transient and limited such trans-
fusion may be at times. 
Yet, the possibility of realizing such transfusion seems to be regularly 
aborted by the grammar of our language.15 The usual description, "I smell the 
rose,'' says nothing about the transfusion between the subject and the object but 
only their mechanical atomistic interaction that leaves all three ontological 
tenns-tbe subject, object, and event of interaction-Substantively intact. I 
speculate that this linguistic constraint negatively affects our ability to sense and 
receive into ourselves the presence of the other. As Thomas Berry (1988) would 
say, perhaps we have become quite autistic. 
I would like to share the following story of my own to illustrate this 
~toti~t~ of moral autism. At a conference not too long ago, I beard a deeply 
tnsptrtng keynote speech on the theme of the caring curriculum. A thundering 
applause indicated that the audience was very much moved by the speech. The 
"':bole audience was then divided into small groups of ten or so to engage in 
d1alogue about what we had heard. Thus, I found myself with a small group of 
strangers. It turned out, from the round of self-introductions which followed 
that in our group were many participants from abroad who had to struggle with 
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their English. Amongst those who were native speakers of English, there was a 
woman who exuded an air of self-confidence and leadership, and she initiated 
the discussions, which was much appreciated. However, when she began to 
speak, it was evident that she was so involved in her own self-expression that 
she was oblivious of our international participants having difficulties in keeping 
up with her. She went on for some time, discoursing in the hest academic style. 
Finally, a man sitting next to me interrupted her with a sensitive apology, sug-
gesting that perhaps we should check with our international participants to sec if 
they were doing alright. They were not. 
What my story illustrates for me is that our capacity for empathy and, 
therefore, moral caring is very much compromised because of our habitual 
egocentric mode. It is as though we each walk around with a thick blanket 
around our head, thus impaired to see, feel, and bear bow others arc. Likewise, 
with a blanket around our bead, others cannot perceive us well. We go around 
cacooned in a blanket of our own thoughts and desires, schemes and projects. 
5. Decentering the ego-self 
The question that shall exercise me now is how we may go about 
decentering egocentricism and radically (in the original sense of getting to the 
root of) expanding care-consciousness. How can we become expansively caring 
to the point of being able to sec the whole of humanity and all the sentient 
hcings as moral subjects to whom one Is prepared to bestow an equal caring as 
to oneself? I am compelled to ask this question by my perception that the 
current world situation of rampant ethnic wars, the rise of senseless crimes 
against innocent people, and world-wide famine and environmental degradation, 
desperately demands of us to radically expand our caring capacity. As I in-
dicated earlier, I am doubtful that we could be radically caring on the model of 
the self-other dichotomy. As long as self-regard is pitted against other-regard, 
chances are that the former wins over, or at least greatly impedes, the latter, 
which suggests to me that it is this dichotomy itself that has to be overc·.ome. 
Y ct, I admit that the task seems totally daunting, given that most of us are firmly 
entrenched in the view tbat the self-other separation is part of our inherent and 
invariant psychic structure. I challenge this belief. Indeed, in my stating that 
such a notion is a belief, I have already challenged it. If it is a belief, it can 
always be revised and replaced, notwithstanding the difficulties of getting 
around our grammar. 
The moment I "forget" to make the distinction between my garbage and 
someone else's, I would simply pick up the garbage that happens to lie in front 
of me in the same way that I would pick up the garbage that I dropped. 
Similarly, the moment my band just reaches out, even without my conscious 
knowing, to support a staggering stranger who happens to be near me in the 
street, it is as though in that brief moment of reaction, I did not distinguish the 
other from the self for that motion of sudden reaching out for support is the 
same spontaneous, proprioceptive gesture of grasping for support if I myself 
were to stagger unsteadily. 
In both of these examples, my caring "behaviour" is predicated upon a 
prior sense of intrinsic relatedness between an individual as a physical body and 
other bodies or things that surround it. I pick up my garbage and take care of it 
because I do not think of it as a foreign matter that I should reject or ignore. I 
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pick up someone else's garbage Jittering the street because I do not perceive the 
street as a foreign site unrelated to me but as a site where my self is "happen-
ing" in dialogical interaction with it. Thus, the garbage on the street, too, is not 
unrelated to me. The second example I gave is even more telling and would 
support my claim that at the physical level we arc actually far more self-other-
related than we assume ourselves to be. If I were not somehow unconsciously, 
but in the bodily way, already attuned to another person ncar me, I would not 
have responded appropriately, as if I were in tune with that person. It is as if my 
proprioception extends beyond my body to other bodies around me. Could we 
not think of moral caring as a kind of moral proprioception? 
Consider another example. In our culture, we arc typically not intrin-
sically related to the land, by which I mean we do not care for the land as we 
would care for our own selves. Under the rubric of development and profit, land 
is exploited and commodified. Thus, for us, land is not a moral subject but a 
commercial object. It would take a tremendous effort on our part to overcome 
the existing understanding of the land and to recover a deeper sense of intrinsic 
relatedness to the point of wanting to extend the deepest caring to the land. 
Facing an extensive deforestation world-wide, projected to be catastrophic, 
recovering such se.nse of deep intrinsic relatedness or continuity with the land is 
not an exotic option but may well be our best survival strategy. 
In trying to get a sense of what something looks like, there is nothing 
quite like seeing an actual full-hlown example of it. What would a truly dcccn-
tered subject, capable of self-other continuity, be like? And what practices may 
cultivate such a subject? In the next section, I raise the example of Buddhism as 
a theory and practice of radical decentering. I use this example, not because I 
think that Buddhism is the only tradition capable of teaching us decentering and 
overcoming the self-other dichotomy but because, first, this is the tradition that I 
am most familiar with and have studied; and second, this tradition rigorously 
articulates the epistemological conditions behind caring consciousness and 
details the practices of the non-dual, caring consciousness. 
6. The Buddhist Care-consciousness 
Changing our metaphysics changes the way we apprehend and, therefore, 
relate to the world. Or, I should say, after Putman (1990), any particular 
metaphysics is a prescription as to bow we ought to say, think, perceive, and so 
on. Buddhism as a metaphysical system is a critique of what in the West has 
come· to referred to as a "Cartesian" substantialist metaphysics wherein 
"things" are understood to have inl1ercnt, atomistic, and, therefore, independent 
self-identities (Kalupahana, 1987; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). In this 
view, "things;' may undergo various changes, but their core essence, which 
defines their self-identity, remains unchanged. For instance, a person is said to 
be the same person, despite constant changes throughout her lifetime, because 
the essence of the person-the authentic self, the soul, the mind, the substance, 
or whatever-remains the same. Likewise for other entities in the phenomenal 
world. But, says the Buddhist, this belief in a world of essence, substance, or 
inherent, self-same properties is illusory for even just by logically thinking 
through the matter, one may realize that the belief in the self-constituted, self-
sufficient nature of things is not defensible and docs not cohere with experience 
upon close inspection. How so? 
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~e argument runs roughly like this: Nothing in our phenomenal world 
has an Immanently self-constituted, self-defining nature because each and every 
thing is constituted by a plethora of other elements. In other words what 
defines a thing is not itself but something else. Thus, there is not a thing' in the 
phenomenal world which does not depend on other things for its self-definition. 
~h!ch Nhat J:Ianh (199.1, pp. 95-96), t11e Vietnamese Zen monk and peace ac-
tiVISt, has wntten a lue1d essay tilled Interbeing on the absence of self-nature of 
all things, and I shall quote an extensively abridged passage as an illustration of 
this argument: 
If you are a poet, you will see clearly that there is a cloud floating in this 
sheet of paper. Wilhout a cloud, !here will be no rain; without rain, the lrees 
ca.nnot grow; and without trees, we cannot make paper . .. . If we look inlo 
thts paper even more deeply, we can see the sunshine in it ... we can see the 
logger ... wheal .. .. The logger's falher and mother are in it, too . ... 
Lo?~ng eve~ more deeply, we can see ourselves in lhis sheet of paper, too. 
Th1s IS not dtflicult to see, because when we look at a sheet of paper, it is 
pa~t of our perception .. .. Everylhing co-exists with this sheet of paper .. .. 
Thts sheet of paper is, because everything else is. 
As I noted earlier, ll•ich Nhat Hanh has coined the term "interbeing" to con-
~tote the Dependent Co-arising (paticca-samuppada) of all phenomena, includ-
mg the self and the object. 
From the perspective of Dependent Co-arising, the self and the other as 
designators for Independent entities are illusory, for, "[m]utually conditioned, 
everything subsists in relationship and knows no independent self-existence"· a 
self is but a "stream of being, a stream of consciousness," and is like a fi~e, 
"[co-igniting] with what it perceives and on which it acts. "16 This description 
of the sel.f, not ~s a sol!d and enduring entity or substance but as a fluid, dynamic 
process, IS not JUSt a f1gure of speech but is based on experience or phenomenal 
o~servation, the .attainment of which is the work of the practice of Buddhist 
mmdfulness (Satlpatthana), popularly known as meditation. Again, in this short 
essay, I can only briefly touch on the topic. 
. ~I forms of discursive practices arc helpful in orienting us towards ccr-
tam v1ews and compel us to entertain certain "pictures" of the world. 
However, they may still be a step short of helping us to embody these pictures 
and to tr_anslat.e them into e~pcrience, for which we may need a more direct way 
of workmg WI~ ~ur c~nsctousness. The mindfulness practice, more popularly 
known as medttahon, IS one such way. It aims not at giving us a "picture" of, 
or an argument for, a way of being, but a direct taste, feel, and insight of it. In 
particular, it aims at enabling the practitioner to psychologically deconstruct the 
us~al ba~itual way of ~eeing and relating to the world in terms of the subject-
object dtchotomy. Tins deconstruction takes the form of what I would call 
"t~mporaliz~tion of all objects," including the self, thereby rendering them as 
flmd, dynamtc, c,o-emergent events or arisings. As the meditator becomes more 
and more refined at maintaining close attention to his or her stream of con-
sc~ousness, he or she may begin to notice "the temporal nature of perception 
pnor to pattern recognition, before stimuli are built up into recognizable per-
cepts or ordinary experience. " 17 Ultimately, the mediator might experience 
something like the following, as Engler explains: 
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When this total moment-to-moment "coming to be and passing away" is 
experienced, there is a profound understanding of the radical impermanence 
(anicca) of all evenls. Not only do r no longer perceive any durable 
"objecls," but even lhe processes of lhinking, feeling, perceiving, and sens-
ing lhemselvcs come lo be and pass away wilhout remainder. In lhis 
experience of perpclual and discontinuous change, such nolions as a solid 
body, a durable perceplual object, an inlernal rcpresenlalion, or even a fixed 
point of oooervalion no longer appear !enable. r come lo understand lhe lack 
of any inlrinsic durabilily anywhere; I become aware of lhe selnessncss 
(anatta) of mind, body, exlernal objects and inlernal represcnlalions. Not 
only does everylhing change all lhe time; there are no "things" which 
change. 18 
When the self-other duality is psychologically deconstructed as through mind-
fulness practice, the usual categorical distinctions that separate one entity from 
another are seen to be human constructs, which is to say that they are not a 
matter of representations of reality, albeit all the same significant and, if chosen 
appropriately, useful. This temporal, nonsubstantialistic apperception of the 
world and the self may become, through cultivation, the foundational layer of 
the meditator's experience upon which the more mundane, substantialistic layers 
of apperception are built. Thus, it is not as though the meditators, once achiev-
ing the nonsubstantialist apperception, would be unable to interact with the 
world as functionally egoic individuals, unable to deploy the grammar of 
subject-object duality. But such functional individuality is deeply informed and 
modified by the insubstantialistic view of the self and the world. The best way I 
can picture this mode of consciousness is as dynamic layering. The attainer of 
such multiplex consciousness would appear as a functional egoic individual but 
is not limited to this and, hence, his or her participation in the egoic individuality 
would be subjunctive and ironic. 
What difference would attaining the view and experience of Dependent 
Co-arising, ontonomy, or nonduality, make for our moral life and practice of 
caring? There are different conceptions of what it is to be moral and practice 
caring. The Buddhist conception, based on the realization of the subject-object 
or self-other inseparableness and continuity, is bound to be different from ones 
that take the duality of the self and the other as an inevitable and fundamental 
given and accordingly work out a deontological prescription or a consequen-
tialist calculus or even a contractarian framework for moral caring. Leaving the 
detail . of comparison to the interested reader, I will just comment on moral 
caring based on nonduality: to a person who bas or is inclined to overcome the 
categorical separation of the subject and object, caring is not a moral imperative, 
an obligation that one bas to perform towards the world. Nor will caring have 
cons~quential objectives, such as happiness, peace, higher quality of living, and 
the hke, although these are likely attained without being aimed at. Caring is 
simply a natural, inevitable expression of the enlightened mind-heart which 
perce~vcs itself to be continuous with the world. Loy says this of the 
bodhisattva, one who is commilled to the ideal and practice of promoting well-
being for all sentient forms (1996, p. 126): "The career of the bodhisattva is 
helping others, not because one ought to do, for the bodhisattva is not bound by 
dogma or [conventional] morality, but because one is the situation, and through 
oneself that situation draws forth a response to meet its needs.'' 
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7. Education, non-dualistically 
With the previous exemplification of the mindfulness practice, I do not 
wish to leave an impression with the reader that I am prescribing such practice 
in schools. While such practice can indeed be incorporated into curricula with 
many beneficial r~ults, I believe that my notion of ontonomy through deccnter-
ing the ego subjectivity is both more radical and less specific, if applied to our 
educational practice. It is more radical in tlte sense that it addresses the fun-
damental aims and character of education; and it is less specific in the sense that 
the practice is not confined to a skill or subject but penneates all school subject<; 
and activities. I shall elaborate my points a little. 
Tite culture of our education is steeped in fortification of the self, as can 
be attested by the prevailing educational objectives of personal empowennent, 
autonomy, c.ontrol, self-esteem, mastery, and competitiveness. As I remarked 
earlier, even the current renewed emphasis on co-operation and community 
cannot dispel the foundational egoic orientation of our education and appears to 
sit uneasily with the latter, if not actually to be part of the same. As long as 
these are taken instrumentally in the service of the individual self, there is no 
real change to the traditional individualistic framework of education. In this 
framework, education with all its material conditions-such as school buildings, 
equipment, textbooks, and teachers-is the means and resource to producing 
individuals of certain qualifications. But if we shift our educational paradigm to 
that of ontonomy, then education is not a means to anything but simply a 
practice and enjoyment of ontonomy itself. It bas no aims other than 
itself-namely, harmonious ways of being in the world, and to this end our 
leaming and teaching take ourselves deeper and deeper into the art of caring. 
We study the forest, animals, cities, gardens, history, literature, the people, and 
so on in order to be better connected to them and, thus, be able to take care of 
them more skillfully and artfully. To be well-educated individuals in this educa-
tional paradigm is to be lovers and nurturcrs of the world. 
Now, my reader might comment that it is not as though students do not 
already study these subjects and topics, and so the question that may be directed 
to me is just how differently these are handled in the ontonomical education. 
Not all ways of studying a subject would have the same result. I can study a 
forest with an intent of destroying it or of saving it. "Forms" of intention, even 
if not made known explicitly, guide the content and the manner of study. Or 
conversely, if we are perspicacious thinkers, we may be able to discem the 
intention from the content and manner of study. Following this line of obser-
vation, I ask what the intention looks like behind the curriculum that focuses 
mostly on the disciplinary subjects but not enough on the students except when 
they prove to be difficult or challenged leamers. By not bringing the students' 
subjectivity into intimate relationship with the objective field (the study), the 
intent of the study becomes, by omission, absence of caring towards what is 
studied for caring includes the knowing, empathic subject. If I were to study the 
water cycle in the manner of acquiring a pile of infonnation, will I come away 
with a profound appreciation, caring, and reverence towards water? In the 
ontonomic practice of education, however, it will not be just the subject matter 
that will have to be studied but the knowing subject's (student's) deepening 
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relationship to it. The objective of such study would be the student's moving 
from a tenuous, limited, or extrinsic relationship with the object to a deeper and 
intrinsic one. Such a mode of study will involve the self's exploration and 
articulation of its perception, emotion, intention, and beliefs while these are 
engaged with the subject matter. Thus, for example, the teacher teaching in this 
mode will not be concerned just with whether the students have learnt given 
facts or mastered certain skills but how differently they come to perceive, feel, 
think and act as a result of or inspired by their engagement with their study. 
'If studying can be an activity of transfusing the self with the object of 
study as well as with an environment which includes both the people we study 
with and the physical setting in which we study, then nonduality or continuity of 
the self and the other could be realized. Such, I argue, is the source of moral 
caring. But when students arc inducted into the perception and practice of 
externalizing and disconnecting the self from what, why, how, where, and with 
whom they study, the result is a radically diminished capacity for caring. 
Notes 
1 The Independent Commission on Population and Quality of Life defines 
carrying capacity as "the maximal sustainable load that humankind can impose 
on the environment before it loses its capacity to support human activity" (Pin-
tasilgo et a/., 1996, p. 97). 
2 In the same report, I learned that one-third of the world population is 
without rudimentary sanitation. Ibid., p. 21. 
3 According to the same report, in 1994 there were some 1.3 billion 
people in absolute poverty, and the gap between the richest 20 percent and the 
poorest 20 percent is widening. 
4 In my opinion, a major step in this direction is to construe economics as 
part of ecology. Such a step has been taken with Daly and Cobb's (1989, 1994) 
publication of For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy towards Com-
munity, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future. 
. ~ Positioning of this boundary varies greatly from individual to individual, 
and culture to culture. In the Hobbesian worldview, the boundary may end at 
the individual self. In some other worldviews-for example, the First Nations' 
and the Classical Chinese, the boundary may extend far into future generations 
and over the whole of Nature. 
·6 A certain amount of guardedness with respect to strangers is only 
reasonable. A stranger is a stranger precisely because one does not know how 
they will act. By "xenophobia" here, however, I mean something more in-
sidious. It is the human tendency to separate what belongs to one's own kind 
from what does not and, moreover, to devalue and even oppress the latter. This 
tetidency plays out intrapsychically, too, and we call it repression. 
7 In "answering" this question, I am deeply influenced by the Buddhist 
psychology and existential psychotherapy. See Loy (1996). 
8 This notion of the enaction of mutual perception by equal consociatcs 
figures centrally in both Taylor (1994) and Habermas (1994) in their respective 
defences of the "politics of recognition." 
9 Contemporary postmodern discourse is preoccupied with the problems 
of subjectivity and self-identity. As Nancy put it: 
12(2), (Spring)1999 15 
The inaugurating decisions of contemporary thought whether they took place 
under the sign of a break with metaphysics and its poorly pitched questions, 
under the sign of a "deconstruction" of this metaphysics, under that of a 
transference of the thinking Deing to the thinking of life, or of the Other, or 
of language, etc. have all involved putting subjectivity on trial. A 
widespread discourse of recent date proclaimed the subject's simple liqui-
dation. (1991~. 5). 
The legitimacy of the notion of an authorial, autonomous self is hotly debated 
while feminist critics are deeply worried about the political consequences of the 
postmodcm dr.construl·tion of suhjccllvlty and self-Identity. I do not wish to get 
mired in these debates since my purpose here lies elsewhere. But I acknowledge 
that the postmodem problematization of the atomistic, autonomous, and self-
presencing subject makes it less daunting for me to advance a conception of self 
that deBt's from th~ .traditional atomistic subjectivity. 
The prevatlmg Western model of moral education is still heavily in-
fluenced by the Kantian moral thought (carried through Piaget and Kohlberg in 
our centu~y) which focuses on the development of autonomous self (Scheewind, 
1998) wbtch, I suggest, should be seen as a progressive abstraction and isolation 
of the self from its environing elements. Thus abstracted, the self then stands 
sovereiyn over and above these clements, exerting control. 
1 In other words, no individual advantage, no co-operation. If so, there is 
no inherent committment to co-operation. It is a thin conception of co-
operation, but I think it is the most we can expect from individualism. 
12 William James came to a similar understanding, according to Wilshire 
(1992, p. 208): "For James, the self includes all that I can call mine, and a 
startling vista opens. Others whose opinions of me matter to me are my others 
and fonn my "social self." As appropriated by me, their images of me belong 
in my body, says James!'' 
13 A passage from Wittgenstein's Tractatus (1961): "5.6-The limits of 
my lan~uage mean the limits of my world.'' 
" For instance, Cummings and Oldham (1998) recommend mindfulness 
training into classroom practice and claim, based on preliminary research, that 
such practice develops students' cognitive and emotional abilities. 
15 Actually, my description here of ontonomic learning and teaching 
should be no stranger to the reader. The basic ideas here have been voiced by 
the giants of our educational ancestors, Whitehead and Dewey. Here I quote a 
passage from Whitehead (1929, p. 3): "By utilizing an idea, I mean relating it to 
that stream, compounded of sense perception, feelings, hopes, desires, and of 
mental activities adjusting thought to thought, which fonns our life." Dewey 
(1938), too, was explicating the same idea with his notion of the "experiential 
continuum" wherein the objective conditions (the curriculum) and the subjec-
tive conditions (tbe student) interact and integrate. Dewey insisted that the 
teacher be ever mindful of what is happening in the students' experiential con-
tinum~:nd discern opportunities for educational growth. 
Macy, 1991, p. 110. 
17 Engler, 1986, p. 42. 
18 Ibid., p. 43. 
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